

## **EXPLANATORY NOTE**

In the case of Nestle Philippines vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 (1987), the Supreme Court pronounced the **sub judice** rule anew. The rule means that when a legal matter or controversy has come under the jurisdiction of a court (**sub judice**), nobody, including the press and other media should interfere by publication or public clamor with the court's proper handling of the proceeding.

The **sub judice** rule is a foreign legal concept. It originated in countries whose justice system have adopted trial by jury, such as the United States.

There is no trial by jury in the Philippines. Yet, not too infrequently, Philippine courts invoke the **sub judice** rule to prohibit the press and other media from reporting, commenting on, or publishing events surrounding a trial. This is notwithstanding the palpable absence of a panel of jurors which need to be impaneled and sequestered from widespread publicity surrounding a court trial. Thus, through long and unfettered court practice, the **sub judice** rule has endeared itself as a reasonable restriction on the constitutional guarantees of free press and of the people's right to petition and information on matters of public concern.

In the United States, the **sub judice** rule also used to be seen as a reasonable restriction on the freedom of the press. Today, however, most U.S. Supreme Court decisions regard it as an unconstitutional impairment of the latter. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 362-363, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "there is nothing that prescribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom." This is just like saying that once public hearing had been held, what transpired there could not be subject to prior restraint.

That trend in America is decidedly a welcome improvement on the **sub judice** rule. It affirms and supports the idea that a people's liberty depends on the freedom of the press which cannot be limited without being lost. Now, if Philippine courts have transplanted the **sub judice** rule into local jurisprudence, perhaps then, it is also high time that they improve on it. The constitutional guarantees of free speech, free press, and right to information occupy lofty positions in the Filipino people's hierarchy of values. Any attempt at "freezing" them, which gag orders or other form of prior restraint do, must be shown to be necessitated by an interest more substantial than the guarantees themselves. Absent such a showing, the **sub judice** rule must be acknowledged by Philippine courts as an impermissible incursion on the salutary constitutional precept that discussion of public affairs in a free society cannot depend on the preliminary grace of judicial censors.

In view of foregoing, elimination of the sub judice rule is earnestly sought in this Bill.

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MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR.

## THIRTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES First Regular Session S. No. \_789 S. No. \_789

## INTRODUCED BY HON. MANUEL B. VILLAR JR.

## THE JUDICIAL RIGHT TO KNOW ACT

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the Judicial Right to Know Act.

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. Conformably with the constitutional guarantees of free press and of the people's right to petition and to information on matters of public concern, it is hereby declared a national policy that no court order, writ or injunction shall issue that would have the effect of enjoining the press and other media from publishing information in connection with a criminal, civil, or administrative case of widespread concern to the community.

SECTION 3. Gag Orders Generally Unlawful; Exception. Court orders, writs, or injunctions which prohibit media reports and commentaries on, or publication of, proceedings held in public or on events that transpire in the courtroom shall be invalid. In cases where the report, commentary, or publication is based on information gained from other sources, i.e., based on events that did not transpire in the courtroom or in a public hearing, a gag order may lawfully issue only upon prior showing by the party who seeks its issuance that the report, commentary, or publication will likely prevent, directly and irreparably, a fair and impartial resolution of the case. This requires a clear showing that the report, commentary or publication will prejudice the outcome of the proceedings of the case and that no less restrictive alternatives are available. Notwithstanding such a showing, a gag order, writ or injunction may not issue, unless it is also shown that a previous report, commentary, or publication will not render the order, writ or injunction inefficacious.

SECTION 4. Repealing Clause. All laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 5. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of the publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,